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In his chapter “Of Virginity” in The Instruction of a
 
Christian Woman (1529), Spanish humanist Juan Luis
 Vives insists on the pricelessness of female chastity,
 locating it beyond the reach of calculated exchange
 values: “I pray thee understand thine own goodness,
 maid, thy price cannot be estimated” (104). While
 scholars of early modern England have analyzed how
 the subject of female chastity is taken up with partic
­ular intensity in the period,1 insufficient attention
 has been paid to how the discourses of female chasti
­ty are inflected by the early modern preoccupation
 with the instability of value in ever-widening net
­works of commodity exchange. Given this preoccu
­pation, the effort to keep personal relations beyond
 the reach of commodity exchange, within an ideal
­ized sphere of the gift, adds special urgency to the
 construction of female chastity. At the same time,
 however, the uneasy status of female sexuality
 
and the  
contradictory constructions of its “value” — even, or
 especially, within marriage — unsettles the cultural
 efforts to construct a strict division between gift and
 commodity.
I want to continue recent discussions of early
 
modern culture’s obsessive concern with what
 William Carroll calls “the fetishized commodity that
 
is
 and is not” (296) by turning to two plays that par ­
ticipate in that fetishizing. Both Thomas Heywood’s
 A Woman Killed with Kindness — first performed in
 March 1603 — and William Shakespeare’s Measure
 for Measure — performed in December 1604, perhaps
1
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for the first time — offer plots that explicitly position a woman s chastity as an
 
object of exchange, but in so doing they enact the conceptual slippage that this
 positioning entails. By setting these two plays in dialogue, we open a window
 onto how women and womens chastity overlap the two systems of exchange,
 slide between them, or escape them.2 This slippage is a problem for a culture
 interested in drawing strict boundaries between gift and commodity exchange
 — a culture facing a radical reworking of how value is constituted. The plays
 become problems when they expose the contradictions entailed in the effort to
 position women as gifts, commodities, or currency, when the resolution of plots
 relies on women used in these ways, or on women who refuse to be used in
 these
 
ways, raising questions about what constitutes women's value. Measure  for  
Measure and A Woman Killed with Kindness, both of which enjoy critical histo
­ries as problem cases,3 reveal that marriage itself can exacerbate the contradic
­tory status of female chastity
 
and the confusion entailed in the effort to keep its  
value beyond estimation.
If for Vives the price of maiden chastity "cannot be estimated,” for Seneca
 
in De Beneficiis (1578)4 — a manual for good giving which insistently distin
­guishes "benefiting” from "merchandizing,” or ordinary bargains and loans —
 "the estimation of so noble a thing should perish if we make a merchandise of
 benefits” (sig. I2V). The treatise focuses on the proper methods and motives for
 giving, receiving, and requiting benefits, methods and motives which, when
 abused or misunderstood, are seen to threaten the distinction Seneca 
so
 insists  
on: "In debts it 
is
 a most upright speech ... to say, Pay that thou owest.- But it  
is the foulest word that can be in benefiting, to say, Pay.” Like the effort to
 purify chastity of the taint of calculation, Seneca eschews those who would
 "reckon” their gifts: "It is a vile Usury to keep a reckoning of benefits, as of
 expenses” (sig. A2V). Those who wish to bestow a benefit "must tread profit
 underfoot” (sig. M2V). Unlike ordinary merchandizing, the motive for
 exchanging benefits is not to profit, but to establish perpetual bonds of fellow
­ship:
[T]o him that lends me money, I must pay no more than I have taken; and
 
when I have paid it, I am free and discharged. But unto the other [one who
 gives a benefit] I must pay more; and when I have requited him, yet never
­theless I am still beholden to him. For when I have requited I must begin
 new again, & friendship warneth me to admit no unworthy person. So 
is the Law of benefits a most holy law, wheroutof springeth friendship.
(sig. E4; emphasis added)
Here we see that the debt of gratitude is not only unmeasurable and "priceless”
 
but it also extends beyond an immediate transaction or set of transactions. The
 thing given, whether it is money, a material object, or a favor, is merely the
 "badge” of the giver’s "good will” (sig. B2); the essence of the benefit
 is
 the bond  
of friendship and obligation between transactors which the thing given signi
­fies. Further, benefits are the very source of friendship; for Seneca, they not
 only affirm social links but are the wellspring of them.
This view of gift exchange as the foundation of social life is precisely the
 
formulation offered in Marcel Mauss’s The Gift, a formulation that Levi-
2
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Strauss extends to the laws of marriage, moving from the exchange of material
 
goods like food or manufactured objects to “that most precious category of
 goods, women” (61). In Lévi-Strauss’s paradigm, woman is “the supreme gift
 among those that can only be obtained in the form of reciprocal gifts” (65).
 Combined with
 
the incest taboo, the exchange of women creates kinship, which  
is, for anthropologists, the founding organizational structure of human society.
 According to Gayle Rubin, the concept implies
a distinction between gift and giver. If women are the gifts, then it 
is
 men  
who are the exchange partners. And it is the partners, not the presents,
 upon whom reciprocal exchange confers its quasi-mystical power of social
 linkage. The relations of such a system are such that women are in no posi
­tion to realize the benefits of their own circulation. As long as the relations
 specify that men exchange women, it is men who are
 
the  beneficiaries of the  
product of such exchange — social organization.
(174)
Rubin continues with 
a
 thorough discussion of the potential limits, from an  
anthropological perspective, of the “traffic in women” concept.5 Despite her
 discussion of the concept’s limits, it is her influential essay — combined with
 Lawrence Stone’s theses about arranged marriages and the patriarchal family
 
in  
Family, Sex, and Marriage in England — which has prompted many literary
 critics to import Lévi-Strauss’s paradigm uncritically into early modern Eng
­land. Part of my goal in reading the representation of female chastity and mar
­riage in Heywood and Shakespeare is to refute the wholesale application of the
 “traffic in women” paradigm to early modern drama and culture.6
2.
A number of relationships and institutions in early modern England are con
­
ceptualized by means of the imaginative systems of gift and commodity
 exchange. As market forces began to cast a wider net across the economy at
 large, bonds of loyalty or allegiance between patron and artist or courtier, mas
­ter and apprentice, master and servant, local landowner and tenant could be
 subordinated to the desire for individual gain, structured by the commodity
 logic that emphasizes the primacy of profit and codified contracts over the
 desire for “gift-debtors.” Relations between friends, mothers and children, hus
­bands and wives are often signified in terms of idealized gift exchange. The
 marital bond often bears the weight of cultural questions about what consti
­tutes and ratifies relations of exchange in the early modern social order more
 generally. Despite efforts such as Seneca’s to keep gift and commodity sepa
­rate, the period's discourses of marriage, like those of many other social rela
­tions and institutions, incorporate elements of the symbolic economies of both
 gift and commodity for its conceptual articulation. Thinking through the “eco
­nomics of love, Richard Horwich argues that many Jacobean comedies
3
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employ the institution of marriage itself as a testing ground for many
 
of the  
new economic ideas which were surfacing at the time. The marital rela
­tionship is often seen through an economic prism, so that human transac
­tions, as well as mercantile ones, come to seem matters of debit and credit,
 profit and loss.
(256)
He argues that the plays often oppose the bond of constancy in marriage to the
 
“hustle of the marketplace” (259) and the circulation of money. Although Hor
­wich offers helpful readings of commercial and monetary imagery in the plays
 he discusses, his notion of the “economic” is too general, especially given the
 multiple forms of exchange available in the period. Not only does Horwich’s
 argument that marriage 
is
 a “testing ground” for newer economic ideas rely on  
a totalized and imprecise notion of the
 
“economic” but it also assumes that mar ­
riage itself is stable and knowable “ground.” The bond of marriage can be con
­ceived as a gift relation, as a mutual
 
bestowing of selves. It can be a trust-based  
and insoluble personal bond; in the words of the “Homily of the State of Mat
­rimony,” marriage allows its partners to live in “perpetual friendly fellowship”
 (“Homily” 13), a phrase resembling Seneca’s descriptions of the insoluble bonds
 forged in benefiting. Marriage is a religious sacrament that 
is
 a “singular gift  
of God”; those who enter the state of matrimony “must acknowledge this ben
­efit of God with pure and thankful minds” (14). At the same time, however,
 marriage 
is
 a legal, contractual, and economic arrangement that ensures the  
legitimate transfer of property. The giving of selves among the propertied 
is accompanied by the transfer of dowry, jointure, and rights of access to proper
­ty, transfers which are formally contracted, quantified, and legally regulated.
 Given the legal status of wives, it is difficult
 
to consider  these transfers as mutu ­
al exchanges.7 The marital relation straddles the competing symbolic
 economies of gift and commodity. Both as trust-based and legally binding, as
 a mutual bestowing of selves and a hierarchy in which women have no
 autonomous legal status, and as an insoluble personal bond and a contract
 accompanied by the transfer of money and property, marriage reveals the diffi
­culties of purifying personal relations of the taint of calculation and contractu
­al obligation.
There are difficulties, moreover, in establishing what exactly comprises true
 
matrimony. Henry Swinburne’s treatise Of Spousals (1686) begins by catalogu
­ing the competing definitions of spousals, and goes on to develop how compet
­ing legal codes not only differ in defining this term but also in identifying what
 constitutes matrimony itself.8 Although he describes several mitigating condi
­tions, Swinburne basically maintains that public solemnization, the giving of
 portions of goods, and even carnal copulation do not supersede the insoluble
 bond created by the free consent offered in spousals de praesenti:
A present & perfect Consent. . . alone maketh Matrimony, without either
 
Publick Solemnization or Carnal Copulation; for neither is the one, nor the
 other of the Essence of Matrimony, but Consent only.... Spousals de prae-
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senti, though not consummate, be in truth and substance very Matrimony,
 
and therefore perpetually indissoluble.
(14-15)9
Swinburne repeatedly refers to the love tokens and gifts that commonly sym
­
bolize the exchange of consent in spousals, but like Seneca’s benefits — in
 which objects exchanged are the “mere badge” of good will between transactors
 — these tokens are merely the expression, not the essence, of the bond between
 transactors. Thus, in defining the essence of matrimony, conscience and inten
­tion figure more prominently than the exchange of material objects, even if the
 “objects” exchanged are bodies in intercourse. Swinburne’s definition therefore
 positions the marital relation as a bond, like that forged by means of benefit
­ing, in the sphere of the gift.
Despite the mitigating conditions and the competition in Swinburne’s trea
­
tise between several potential ratifying acts or objects — “effects” such as the
 kiss, taking of hands, or gifts; “subarration”; public solemnization; and consum
­mation — he nonetheless adheres to the position that present consent alone
 constitutes the essence of matrimony. The exchange of trust-based vows that is
 the spousal, rather than more external and publicly regulated practices, consti
­tutes the essence of
 
matrimony. Swinburne’s response to questions about the  
relationship between public ratification and intention offers an ideal that is dif
­ficult to achieve in practice, because the intentions of marital “transactors” are
 often difficult, if not impossible, to verify in a court of law. Yet the ideal per
­sists — even in a legal treatise. Concerned as they are with exploring what
 makes relations of exchange binding,
 
A Woman Killed with Kindness and Mea ­
sure for Measure exert tremendous pressure on this ideal, exposing the contra
­dictory function of female chastity and how it can preclude the happy union of
 gift and commodity in the institution of marriage. Because they slide between
 the competing imaginative economies, female chastity and marriage reveal the
 contradictions entailed in the effort to purify personal relations of the taint of
 calculation and contractual obligation.
3.
In the final scene of Measure for Measure, Angelo trivializes his and Mariana’s
 
original spousals — a trust-based vow of constancy — calling them “some
 speech of marriage” (5.1.222). Calculated considerations weigh more heavily
 for him than his verbal promises: Mariana’s “promised proportions / Came
 short of composition” (224-5). These justifications, along with Angelo’s spe
­cious claim that Mariana’s “reputation was disvalued” (226), might at first be
 seen as the best illustration of how the institution of marriage straddles the
 economies of gift and commodity, and might tempt us to see Angelo as the sole
 figure of a commodity mentality that disrupts an ideal of marriage of true
 minds. But Angelo’s deceitful self-defenses are not the only impediments to
 this ideal. After Mariana unmasks, she explains that “this is the body / That
 took away the match from Isabel, / And did supply thee at thy garden-house /
5
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In her imagin’d person” (214-17). When the duke asks Angelo, “know you this
 
woman?”, Lucio puns, “Carnally, she says” (217-18). Mariana goes even further
 than Lucio, however, claiming Angelo “knew me 
as
 a wife” (235); her claim that  
Angelo knew her as wife even though he “imagined” she was Isabel implies that
 carnal exchange alone is sufficient to make them husband and wife. For Swin
­burne, this is “not true Matrimony in conscience.” It isn’t just that Mariana has
 not read her Swinburne, for the duke-as-friar makes this claim 
as
 well  when he  
justifies the bed trick to her (4.1.71-4), elevating the “rules and precepts of law”
 over trust-based intention. The whole play shares in the nervousness of Mari
­ana’s statement that “I am affianc’d as strongly / As words could make up vows”
 (232-3). Couched in this assertion is a question: just how strongly can words
 make up vows? Mariana’s “could” indicates a distrust of verbal promises that
 the entire play shares. In Shakespeare’s Vienna, promises are unreliable and
 there 
is
 no guarantee that  people, including the duke,  will not say one thing and  
mean another.
Seneca’s treatise on gift-giving rejects recourse to the law as the means of
 
enforcing the bonds of fellowship created by
 
benefits. Seneca insists on “mens’  
consciences” rather than “surety” to guarantee obligation:
Thou stainest [benefits], if
 
thou make them a matter of Law. . . . Would  
God that no surety might be taken of the purchaser by the seller, nor bar
­gains and covenants be made under hand & seal: but rather, that the per





 Seneca calls for trust rather than “surety” — a legal bond or piece of  
property used to guarantee fulfillment of an obligation — as the binding force
 of exchange, duke
 
Vincentio, disguised as the friar, condemns  “security,” or con ­
tractual obligations, as the solvent of trust-based fellowship:
There is scarce truth enough alive to make societies secure, but security
 
enough to make fellowships accurs’d. Much upon this riddle runs the wis
­dom of the world.
(3.2.221-4)
Although the duke’s opposition here between contractual obligation and trust
­
based transactions parallels the Senecan view of what binds men in fellowship,
 the duke’s assertion
 
remains an empty aphorism, for  the logic of exchange oper ­
ating in Measure belies the duke’s aphoristic wisdom. Despite his repeated
 invocation of the language of the benefit to justify the bed trick, the duke
 betrays the calculated, and calculating, understanding underpinning his plan.
 He tells Isabella that “the satisfaction
 
I would require is likewise your own ben ­
efit” (3.1.154-5) and that “I do make myself believe that you may most upright-
 eously do a poor wrong’d lady a merited benefit” (197-9). Claiming that the
 bed trick and Mariana’s pregnancy “may compel [Angelo] to her recompense”
 (3.1.250), the duke corrupts the language of idealized benefiting
 
with the taint  
6
Journal X, Vol. 5 [2020], No. 1, Art. 5
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jx/vol5/iss1/5
Barbara Sebek 57
of deceit and coercion. (He also assumes that the one-night stand will result in
 
conception, the confirmation of sexual exchange.) The coercion and deceit the
 duke’s benefits entail align them with the debased forms of exchange against
 which Seneca posits the economy of the benefit. In the duke’s alliterative jus
­tification of deceit — “the doubleness of the benefit defends the deceit from
 reproof” (254-6) — he quantifies gains, undermining the Senecan notion that
 it is “a foul shame ... a
 
vile Usury to keep a reckoning of benefits, as of expens ­
es” (sig. A2V). Further, the duke relies on rather than rejects “security” when he
 rationalizes the deceit of the bed trick to Mariana:
He is your husband on a pre-contract;
 
To bring you thus together, ’tis no sin,
 Sith that the justice of your title to him
 Doth flourish the deceit.
(4.1.71-4)10
Likening his plan to a speculative agrarian enterprise, the duke again betrays
 
the commodified imagination underlying the “benefits” he doles out to his sub
­jects: “Our corn’s to reap, for yet our tithe’s to sow” (75). The impersonal sex
­ual exchange of the bed trick 
is
 likened to sowing grain to pay  tithe dues; doing  
this will lead to the harvest, the contractually enforced marital union.
The duke further reveals a calculating, “measured” understanding of mar
­
riage and social exchange by positing an economy of craft, vice, and deceit that
 is necessary in order to “exact” the “performance” of the “old contracting”
 between Mariana and Claudio:
Craft against vice I must apply.
With Angelo tonight shall he
His old betrothed but despised;
So disguise shall, by th’ disguised,
 
Pay with falsehood false exacting,
 And perform an old contracting.
(3.2.270-5)
Victoria Hayne suggests that this passage “crown[s] the developing intimacy
 
between the audience and the Duke-friar,” inviting the audience’s complicity in
 the opposition to vice that the disguised duke enacts (26). The plodding
 tetrameter of the duke’s lines emphasizes the measure-for-measure logic that
 
he  
follows, a logic that underlies the complicated exchanges and substitutions that
 generate the play’s final marriages. In addition to presenting the duke 
as
 a  
“kind of inverted Vice figure,” the play presents him as constructing 
a
 kind of  
inverted gift economy, one that draws on the rhetoric of benefits. Rather than
 inviting the audience’s complicity in the opposition to vice, the play invites its
 complicity in the deceit and contractual vision of marriage and social relations
 that the duke “performs.”
For the duke, virtue itself functions like currency. In order to have value,
 
he claims, Angelo’s virtue must circulate. Vincentio calls nature a “creditor” to
7
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him. Rather than hoarded in  the convent, Isabella’s chastity must be  put  
into circulation as well, the controlled circulation of marriage.11 After present
­ing his “offer” of marriage in imperative form, “Give me your hand and say you
 will be mine” (5.1.497), the duke corrects himself in order to make his propos
­al more suited to the staged princely magnanimity of his final pardons: “I have
 a motion much imports your good, / Whereto if you’ll a willing ear incline, /
 What’s mine 
is
 yours and what is yours is mine” (540-2).12
The parodic “good turns” between Pompey and Abhorson approximate the
 Senecan ideal of benefits more closely than any other exchanges we see in the
 play:
ABHORSON Come on, bawd. I will instruct thee in my trade; follow.
POMPEY I do desire to learn, sir; and I hope, if you have occasion to use me
 
for your own turn, you shall find me yare. For truly, sir, for your kindness
 I owe you a good turn.
(4.2.54-9)
The jocular goodwill between
 
the bawd and hangman  — a  parodic rendering of  
the relation between master and apprentice — is set in re
l
ief against the shady  
“good turns” between the duke and the Provost in the same scene: the duke
 asks for a “dangerous courtesy” (162), and has much ado to convince the fear
­ful Provost to grant his suit. Except for the parodic good turns between Pom
­pey and Abhorson, the closest we come to a gift ethos in Measure for Measure
 emerges in the final scene, as the duke requites his subjects with pardons, mer
­ciful punishments, and marriage offers. However, the play exposes the machi
­nation and calculation that
 
buttress the duke’s display of sovereign clemency, as  
well 
as
 exposing how his pose as the liberal gift-giver at the end of the play  
relies on the very antithesis of the gift, the “security” that he earlier decries.
 The play’s project therefore diverges starkly from one of its probable sources,
 Whetstone’s Right Excellent and Famous History of Promos and Cassandra
 (1578), which aims to show “the perfect magnanimitye of a noble kinge, in
 checking Vice and
 
favouringe  Vertue: Wherein is showne, the Ruyne and over-  
throwe, of dishonest practices, the advauncement of upright dealing” (tide
 page). Rather than “upright dealing” and “perfect magnanimitye,” the duke
 himself engages in deceitful substitutions and “dishonest practices.” Despite
 Vincentio’s (largely ineffective) efforts to interrogate and reform his subjects’
 consciences, Measure reveals the extent to which sovereign power enforces con
­tracts as a way of regulating sexual desire.13 Sexual desire, including marital
 sexuality, 
is
 subordinated in the play to a contractual, commodified logic that  
barely acknowledges the personal bonds of
 
constancy associated with the gift.  
While Angelo enforces legal bonds he tries to evade them himself, the duke, as
 we have seen, relies on legally enforceable contractual obligations even as he
 condemns them.
The duke and Angelo are not alone in Vienna, of course, in adopting a
 
commodified perspective of sexual relations. The bawds most frankly
 
acknowl ­
edge, and profit from, the fink between sexuality and commodity exchange.
8
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Pompey, for example, envisions the ramifications of the new law against forni
­
cation for the housing market: "If this law hold in Vienna ten year, I’ll rent the
 fairest
 
house in it after threepence a bay” (2.1.239-41).14 He conflates the "two  
usuries,” money-lending and procuring for fornication, pointing to the capri
­ciousness of the law that condemns one while allowing the "worser” (3.2.6-8).
 Even the chastened Claudio betrays a commodified understanding of virtue
 when he claims that Authority
 
"make[s] us pay down for our offense by weight  
/ The words of heaven” (1.2.121-2). Lucio jestingly responds that he would
 send for his creditors if he were so eloquent under arrest (133). Here Lucio,
 like Pompey, conflates sexual and financial crimes, as does Angelo when he
 describes fornication as "coining heaven’s image in stamps that are forbid”
 (2.4.45-6). Behind the conflation of bastardizing and counterfeiting lurks the
 assumption that producing legitimate children is like minting coins.15 Unlike
 bastard children, legitimate ones are authorized by the "stamp” of public
 authority, or "outward order” (1.2.149), as Claudio calls it when vouching for
 the legitimacy of his marriage to, "mutual” sexual commerce with, and "posses
­sion of” Juliet: 
Thus stands it with me: upon a true contract
I got possession of Julietta’s bed.
You know the lady; she is fast my wife,
 
Save that we do the denunciation lack
 Of outward order. This we came not to,
 Only for propagation of a dow’r
 Remaining in the coffer of her friends,
 From whom we thought it meet to hide our love
 Till time had made them for us. But it chances
 The stealth of our most mutual entertainment
 With character too gross is writ on Juliet.
(145-51)
While waiting publicly to solemnize their marriage in the hopes of "propagat
­
ing” a dowry —
 
wresting the wealth of Juliet’s "friends” out of their coffers and  
into circulation — Juliet and Claudio "unhappily” (157) propagate 
a
 child.  
These confusions between sexual desire, procreation, and legally-based finan
­cial exchanges even infiltrate the insulated world of the moated grange where
 Mariana resides; just
 
before the duke arrives, the boy’s song images kisses as the  
"seals of love” that are "seal’d in vain” (4.1.5-6).
Hence, the play does not merely elide illicit sexual exchange with commod
­
ity exchange and the circulation of money. The pervasiveness of substitution in
 Measure for Measure16 reveals how female chastity can be made to function like
 currency in the enforcement of "true” marriage contracts. As long as she 
is chaste — a difficult "fact” to determine — one woman can stand in for anoth
­er; their very interchangeability renders them equivalent,17 precluding the pos
­sibility of personal bonds that are the definitive feature of a gift transaction.
 This impersonal exchangeability is even more clear in the case of the duke’s
 machinations than in the case of prostitution; the bawds trade bodies for money,
9
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whereas in the bed trick, as Marc Shell points out (125), Isabellas and Mari
­
ana’s chaste bodies function like money. In his efforts to close the deal that will
 force Isabella to yield up what she calls the “gift of my chaste body” (5.1.102),
 Angelo simply makes explicit how the “most holy law” of the benefit is a staged
 affair, based on substitutions, legitimated by the logic of the commodity. Words
 alone cannot create the faithful intentions that should make up vows, but nei
­ther can formal contracts alone. The play exposes the need for staged sovereign
 liberality the pretense of a gift economy — to supplement strict legal
 enforcement on the one hand18 and conscience on the other, both of which, on
 their own, fail to bind men, and men and women, in fellowship. Through its
 treatment of female chastity, the play shows how the pretense of sovereign lib
­erality actually reinforces the measured, commodified basis of social relations.
The duke’s argument that Angelo owes nature “use,” or interest, for the
 
virtue she has loaned to him parallels Aristotelian arguments about money
 appealed to in the defense of usury. Based on the idea that usury 
is
 a crime of  
intent, rather than a factual, contractual matter, Du Moulin argues that usurers
 create “a relationship between those who have money and those who need
 money. Without them money would
 
be nearly useless. Moreover, money is the  
most useful when it is most used, and usurers see to it that it is kept in use”
 (quoted in Jones 17). Money is only productive when it is kept in circulation,
 not hoarded. Keeping female sexuality out of circulation likewise curtails its
 productivity, a line of argument familiar from Parolles’s speeches on
 
virginity in  
All's Well that Ends Well:
It 
is
 not politic in the commonwealth of nature to preserve virginity. Loss  
of virginity 
is
 rational increase, and there was never virgin got till virginity  
was first lost.... Keep it not; you cannot choose but lose by’t. Out
 
with’t!  
Within t’ one year it will make itself two, which is a goodly increase, and
 the principal itself not much the worse. Away with’t! . . . ’Tis a commodi
­ty will lose the gloss with lying; the longer kept, the less worth. Off with’t
 while ’tis vendible; answer the time of request.
(1.1.128-31,147-50,154-6)
Although Helena’s own socially-based transacting with the King of France and
 
the Florentine women in All's Well come to complicate this notion of how
 
vir ­
ginity acquires its value in the
 
“commonwealth of nature,”  Parolles offers a clear,  
if facetious, sense of how arguments about the relation between use, exchange,
 and value can easily be appropriated to discuss women’s sexuality. Female sex
­uality does indeed gain cultural value by circulating, but it is often circulation
 controlled by authorities other than young women themselves.19
We can thus see how these texts’ figurations of female chastity jostle
 
against the ideological strategies in Seneca’s De Beneficiis, and in the wider cul
­tural discourses of exchange, for keeping the forces of commodification at bay.
 Golding’s Seneca offers a moral economy of the benefit that purifies personal
 relations from the taint of commerce by keeping them distinct from traffic in
 quantifiable, alienable objects that rely on formal contract and the law as the
 guarantors of honest dealing. Like Seneca’s “benefits,” the construction of
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female chastity is, in part, an ideological strategy for keeping sexual relations
 
distinct from commodity relations. The obsession
 
with  womens chastity in the  
period is an elaborate defense against how, in some contexts, a chaste woman
 can be made to function as a kind of currency — an arbitrarily authorized unit
 of measure with no use-value of its own — to ensure the legitimacy of a system
 of private property.20 Barbara Baines asserts that chastity is a theologically pre
­scribed virtue that is “appropriated as the standard upon which the economy of
 secular power 
is
 based” (284).21 A market economy depends on just such a set  
standard by which the values of commodities can be measured. The construc
­tion of women s sexuality through the moral virtue chastity in plays, homilies,
 conduct books, is an effort to keep it priceless, a matter of conscience :— as
 Vives implores, “I pray thee, understand thine own goodness, maid, thy price
 cannot be estimated” (104) — out of the reaches of a system of exchange gov
­erned by calculated exchange values. Although it does so less directly than
 Parolles’s witty speech, Measure exposes such a system as that which often
 determines the “value” of female chastity. The complex, calculating negotia
­tions that generate the play’s marriages expose that the gift ethos is a ruse —
 albeit a necessary one — that both relies on and buttresses the logic and
 motives of the commodity.
4.
If in Measure for
 
Measure, female chastity helps to expose the economy of the  
gift 
as
 a necessary fuse, in Thomas Heywood’s A Woman Killed with Kindness  
— another play with a critical history as a problem case — marital chastity
 exposes the limits of 
a
 conscious gift ethos. Unlike the pervasive commodity  
mentality of Vienna, Heywood’s gentry have an acute sense of the gift ethic,
 even among those such as Wendoll and the usurer Shafton who violate it. The
 play opens with the celebration of John and Anne Frankford’s marriage.
 Although Heywood does not stage the precise moment at which the couple
 exchanges “present consent” (as Swinburne would call it), its definitive elements
 — the exchange of vows and the taking of hands — are scattered throughout
 the opening scene and the play generally, indicating some nervousness over
 trust-based marital vows. Francis Acton, Anne Frankford’s brother, “borrows”
 her hand to dance: “By
 
your leave, sister — by your husband’s leave /  I should  
have said — the hand that but this day
 
/ Was given you in the church, I’ll bor ­
row” (1.6-8). Anne Frankford’s hand is her husband’s hand, but her husband’s
 itself was “given” to her. Acton and Charles Mountford clasp hands in a friend
­ly wager (“here’s my hand” [101]), as do their followers Cranwell and Wendoll
 (“What, clap you hands? / Or is’t not bargain?” “Yes, and stake them down”
 (106-7)). When Charles Mountford is first freed’ from prison for murdering
 one of Acton’s followers during a hunt, Shafton soon reveals that his friendly
 offers of money and hands — “Sir Charles, a hand, a hand — at liberty!” (5.21)
 — are disingenuous: “If I can fasten but one finger on him, / With my full
 hand I’ll grip him to the heart. / ’Tis not for love I proffered him this coin, /
 But for my gain and pleasure” (50-3). In all cases, the moment of promise or
11
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friendly wager — rendered physically in the taking of hands — modulates to
 
antagonism, violence or the betrayal of trust, or, in the case of Shafton, was
 insincere to begin with.22 Anne will be borrowed from Frankford by Wendoll;
 the hunting competition between Acton and Charles quickly escalates to vio-.
 lence that culminates in Charles committing murder; and Charles’s loan (with
 interest, of course) from Shafton leads to his second arrest and ultimate
 bondage to vengeful Acton who pays his debts. The play’s anxiety over the
 nuptial spousal manifests itself first by the dispersal of the moment of promise
 throughout the opening scene, and then through the eruption of violence or
 betrayal in the scenes that follow. Heywood’s play shares in the fear of Shake
­speare’s Vienna that words cannot “make up vows” and the concomitant fear
 that perhaps it is only formal legal regulation (the “bond”) that can bind men,




the play’s characters, Shafton is certainly the least compelling and the  
least “developed” or “motivated”; in fact, he disappears from the play complete
­ly after having Charles arrested for debt in scene seven, making him seem like
 a gratuitous plot device. But his function is central: he plays out the logic by
 which competing forms of exchange can only be articulated relationally.23 His
 repeated references to and delight in litigation (5.35-8; 7.29-30, 57-62, 70-1)
 counter the appeals to conscience throughout the play, thus serving as the
 antithesis to the gift ethic.24 Willfully disregarding the knowledge that “love”
 should be what motivates his offers, the bad giver Shafton serves as the neces
­sary foil to the disinterested liberality of
 
Frankford, which erupts inexplicably  
in the scene immediately preceding Shafton’s equally inexplicable usurious
 offers.
It is in this scene that we finally witness John Frankford taking vows — not
 
with his wife Anne, but with Wendoll.25 Here, John offers all at his disposal in
 order to forge a friendship with him:
Frankford I will allow
 
you, sir,
Your man, your gelding, and your table,
 All at my own charge. Be my companion.
WENDOLL Master Frankford, I have oft been bound to you
By many favours; this exceeds them all
 
That I shall never merit your least favour.
 But when your last remembrance I forget,
Heaven at my soul exact that weighty debt.
FRANKFORD There needs no protestation, for I know you
 
Virtuous, and therefore grateful. Prithee Nan,
 Use him with all thy loving’st courtesy.
ANNE As far 
as
 modesty may well extend,  
It is my duty to receive your friend.
FRANKFORD To dinner, come sir; from this present day,
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Except for the lines between John and Anne, this interchange could be read as
 
a staging of De Beneficiis: John creates perpetual companionship by liberal giv
­ing (“Welcome to me forever”), and Wendoll is conscious that he is bound by
 the “weighty debt” of gratitude, gratitude that Frankford elides with virtue and
 sees as its logical result (“I know you / Virtuous, and therefore grateful”). As
 with the earlier examples, this moment of promise will be violated; Wendoll
 seduces Anne and 
is
 “profuse in Frankford’s richest treasure [that is, Anne]”  
(11.116). But the problem at the heart of this plot and of the play 
is
 not adul ­
tery, but rather how an ethic of absolute generosity expressed in gift-giving
 conflicts with the control of
 
wifely chastity as a privately owned, semi-com-  
modified object. The scene in which this interchange occurs opens with John’s
 catalogue of his treasured possessions, “chief / Of all” being his “fair” and
 “chaste” wife (4.1-14). John wants to share all his stuff with Wendoll, but
 unlike his other possessions — table, purse, horses, servants — Anne has to be
 proper to him, and can’t be given. Her response to John’s command to “use”
 Wendoll suggests that she 
is
 aware of the limits her “modesty” places on John’s  
ability to be a liberal giver. Rather than viewing friendship with Wendoll 
as
 a  
gift freely given, Anne views Wendoll as one whom it is a contractual “duty to
 receive” (82). John cannot say without qualification to
 
Wendoll “what’s mine is 
yours,” because Anne is proper to him; unlike all other property in a commod
­ity economy, however, she 
is
 not alienable, she can’t be transferred or loaned to  
another “owner.”26
In Wendoll’s prolonged soliloquy before the seduction scene (6.1-52) — a
 
dramatized struggle with conscience — he acknowledges
 
John’s generosity, the  
bond it creates, as well as the consequences of
 
being ungrateful to his liberal  
donor. In his witting violation of the gift ethic, the play clearly constructs
 Wendoll’s crime not as adultery
 
with Anne but as ingratitude to her husband:
He doth maintain me; he allows me largely
 
Money to spend—
My gelding and my man.
This kindness grows of no alliance ’twixt us
I never bound him to me by desert;
He cannot eat without me,
Nor laugh without me; I am to his body
 
As necessary as his digestion,
And equally do make him whole or sick.
And shall I wrong this man? Base man! Ingrate!
 
Hast thou the power straight with thy gory hands
 To rip thy image from his bleeding heart?
... or rend his heart
To whom thy heart was joined and knit together?
(6.27-28, 31, 33, 35, 40-46, 49-50)
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When Anne relays Johns message that Wendoll is to “be a present Frankford
 
in his absence” (6.78), we discover that the problem is not only that Anne is a
 possession that cannot be given but that John cannot fully fuse with his “com
­panion” Wendoll. Although the gift-generated bond between the two men 
is so strong that it makes their desire for the same woman seem almost inevitable,
 their loss of the “proper” self should not extend to Johns relationship with
 Anne. During the seduction scene, Anne reiterates what Wendoll has already
 articulated, that John “esteems” Wendoll “even 
as
 his [own] brain, his eye-ball,  
or his he rt” (6.113-14). The two hearts “joined and knit together” are torn
 asunder by the disruptive force of heterosexual desire, a force that cannot be
 contained by the ethic of the gift, an ethic of which Wendoll is wholly aware.
 Wendoll’s repeated willingness to “hazard all” (129,137) in order to have Anne
 reveals that conflicting social and sexual relations can entail the kinds of risks
 associated with commodity exchange. However, the play pointedly constructs
 Wendoll’s crime as a breach of the gift ethic. Just 
as
 Golding’s Seneca argues  
that one finds “an unthankful person” beneath all social vices (sig. B3V), Wen-
 doll’s ingratitude to John is presented as the root of the marital and social dis
­order in Woman Killed. For him, adultery is an incidental crime. He plans to
 wander on the continent “where the report of my ingratitude / Cannot be
 heard,” and then to return once this crime, not adultery, is forgotten so that he
 can seek honor and praise at court (16.129-37).27 
Honor, of course, 
is
 not gender neutral, and in Anne’s case adultery is not  
an incidental crime. Upon his servant’s disclosure of Wendoll and Anne’s
 actions, John’s thoughts immediately turn to her birth, education, repute, car
­riage, and demeanor, 
a
ll of which previously indicated that she was “modest,  
chaste, and godly. / Is all this seeming gold plain copper?” (8.99-105). John’s
 reaction and question points to the fragility of the usual means by which the
 value and “surety” of wifely chastity is constructed. Anne’s homiletic address to
 the women in the audience once her crime has been discovered suggests that
 unchaste wives debase something other than their own value:
O women, women, you that have yet kept
Your holy matrimonial vow unstained,
Make me your instance: when you tread awry,
 
Your sins like mine will on your conscience lie.
(13.142-5)
Anne’s “yet” hints at the tenuousness of that holy vow, as if the women she
 
addresses were just on the
 
verge of doing some staining. Significantly, the mat ­
rimonial vow is what would be stained, not the womens’
 
value or reputation, or  
even their bodies. Like Swinburne, who posits the exchange of vows as the
 essence of matrimony, Anne’s address to her female audience suggests that the
 exchange of faithful vows outweighs the giving of bodies in intercourse in mak
­ing a true marriage. It is her sin of “staining” not her chaste body but this trust
­based vow that lies on Anne’s conscience after John discovers her.
Illustrating how liberal giving can be used to express enmity, John keeps
 
offering gifts and courtesies as he plots to entrap Anne and Wendoll (11.38-40,
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48-9, 63-4). His novel form of punishment of Anne for committing adultery
 
— the titular “kindness” and Heywood’s innovation in the revenge plot — 
is appropriate because it reveals Johns effort to keep his relationship to Wendoll
 and to Anne in the sphere of the gift. Rather than taking legal action, taking
 their lives, or physically punishing them (as Anne begs him to do just before
 addressing the women in the audience), he lets them contemplate their viola
­tion of the “most holy law” of the gift; he tells Wendoll:
When thou record st my many courtesies
And shalt compare them with they treacherous heart,
Lay them together, weigh them equally,
’Twill be revenge enough.
(13.72-5)
This weighing and calculating takes place within the sphere of
 
the gift, since  
conscience, rather than the law, is to serve as the agent of punishment. John
 doles out to Anne a “judgment” that is even more “liberal”:
Woman, hear thy judgment:
Go, make thee ready in thy best attire,
Take with thee all thy gowns, all thy apparel;




whose sight being left here in the house  
I may remember such 
a
 woman by.
Choose thee a bed and hangings for a chamber;
Take with thee everything that hath thy mark,
 
And get thee to my manor seven mile off,
 Where live. ’Tis thine; I freely give it thee.
 My tenants by shall furnish thee with wains
 To carry all thy stuff, within two hours,
 No longer, will I limit thee my sight.
Choose which of all my servants thou likest best,
 
And they are thine to attend thee.
(158-72)
In “freely” giving Anne all this “stuff,” John uses the same acts of generosity by
 
which he had tried to establish his friendship with Wendoll to “torment
 [Anne’s] soul” (156) and to mark his estrangement from her.28 “It was thy
 hand,” he tells her, “cut two hearts out of one” (186). The heart joined in mat
­rimony is not the only “one” that has been sundered, since the two hearts of
 John and Wendoll were also “joined and knit together”; as Wendoll addressed
 himself before seducing Anne: “Ingrate! / Hast thou the power straight with
 thy gory
 
hands / To rip thy image from his bleeding heart? ... or rend his heart  
/ To whom thy heart was joined and knit together?” (6.44-6, 49-50)
In the final scene of Measure for Measure, I have argued, the friar-duke has
 
to use the pretense of
 
princely magnanimity to supplement his earlier unsuc ­
cessful efforts to shape and interrogate his subjects’ consciences rather than
15
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enforce the law against fornication. In staging that magnanimity he relies on
 
the commodity logic that is usually seen as its antithesis. When the law against
 adultery and ingratitude has been violated in John Frankford’s “little common
­wealth,” his liberal, gift-driven punishment of Anne allows her to repent on her
 own so that John is able to shape the consciences of his subjects as Duke Vin-
 centio could not. John deploys the same generosity by which he had forged a
 bond with Wendoll to force Anne to repent. Repentance is itself
 
an internal ­
ized process centered on the individual subject’s conscience, so that John’s
 enabling of it through his “kindness,” unlike external punishments or execution,
 resides
 
within the sphere of the gift.29 His gift-based punishment allows Anne  
herself to repent her crimes, but only on the condition that her connection with
 her husband and his children is broken:
But, as thou hopest for heaven, as thou believest
 
Thy name’s recorded in the book of life,
 I charge thee never after this sad day
 To see me, or to meet me, or to send
 By word, or writing, gift, or otherwise
 To move me, by thyself, or by thy friends,
 Nor challenge any part in my two children.
(13.173-9)
As John’s prohibitions here indicate, Anne’s estrangement from him is signified
 
by her inability to approach him as a gift-giver. Anne proceeds to repent with
 a vengeance, symbolized when she bids Nick to break her beloved lute, which
 John, wishing to remove all material traces of Anne, has sent after her. Anne
 wishes to break the lute “not as my husband’s gift, but my farewell / To all
 earth’s joy” (16.74-5). She does not reject the gift that constitutes part of his
 punishment but rather renounces the material and sensual pleasures that the
 instrument signifies; with them she renounces life itself, as she proceeds to
 starve herself to death. Anne’s death finally allows John to forgive her —
 “Though thy rash offence / Divorced our bodies, thy repentant
 
tears / Unite our  
souls” (17.107-9) — and to restore them to their married state, the “singular
 gift of God,” 
as
 the Homily of Matrimony calls it.30
No matter how successfully Frankford keeps his “judgment” and forgive
­ness of Anne in the sphere of the gift, however, it is the status of
 
her marital  
chastity partially outside of this sphere that gets them in trouble in the first
 place. Having been given in marriage, Anne’s chastity is out of circulation.
 Unlike the other possessions which he offers to Wendoll, her chaste body can
­not serve as a “badge” of Frankford’s good will; it cannot be given or shared, and
 therefore cannot help cement the relationship between the two men as John’s
 other gifts do. The following exhortation from Vives is therefore only partial
­ly accurate:
And know thou this, woman, that the chastity and honesty which thou hast
 
is not thine, but committed and betaken unto thy keeping by thine hus
­
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band. Wherefore thou dost the more wrong to give away that thing
 
which  
is  another body’s, without the owner’s license.
(113)
If, as Vives cautions, a woman’s chastity 
is
 not hers to give — or if, as Ruth  
Kelso states, it 
is
 the "greatest gift to her husband” (97) she brings in marriage  
— once the marriage transaction takes place, a woman’s chastity
 
is not her hus ­
band’s to give either. Anne’s value as a wife derives from her being the private
 and inalienable property of John. Neither gift nor commodity (since the defin
­itive feature of a commodity is its exchangeability), the ambiguous status of
 wifely chastity conflicts with the ethic of open generosity and loss of proper
 identity
 
which constitutes  John’s friendship with Wendoll.
5.
In Heywood’s play, we encounter another plot in which a woman’s chastity
 
(again a sister’s as in Measure for Measure) is figured as an object of exchange.31
 Like Isabella, Susan Mountford faces the choice between preserving her chasti
­ty and preserving her brother. Unlike Claudio, however, Charles Mountford’s
 life 
is
 not at stake. Rather, Susan is called on to save his honor, an honor that  
is wholly constituted by adhering to an ethic of the gift. When Susan fears that
 Acton will pursue legal action, Charles responds that "my conscience is become
 my enemy / And will pursue me more than Acton can” (3.70-3). Like a good
 Senecan (and not unlike the Frankfords) he recognizes the binding power of
 conscience over that of legal enforcement. Charles is later imprisoned a second
 time because he refuses to sell his ancestral home to the usurer Shafton to
 whom he owes money. He refuses, in short, to acknowledge the commodifica
­tion of his ancient home; he figures the sale as a defloration, calling the title to
 the house a "virgin title never yet deflowered” (7.23). Because he resists
 Shafton’s seductive offers to buy the estate, Charles goes to prison owing the
 principal and the "use.” Literalizing the metaphor of defloration by which he
 figured the sale of the family home, he calls on Susan to offer her chastity to
 repay his debt to Acton, who has freed him from prison. Charles’s metaphor
 — and the subsequent actions (and transactions) that explore this metaphor’s
 explanatory power — draw the connection between a crucial cluster of proper
­ties that have to be passed on and transferred in order to have value, but that
 have to be kept in controlled circulation by being cautiously given as gifts or
 traded as "terminal commodities”: female chastity, the family name and estate,
 and the sense of personal honor that derives from them.32
In a double movement that illustrates the relationality of gift and com
­
modity, the play juxtaposes an idealized gift ethic with rigorous scrutiny of its
 material and calculable consequences. This attention to materiality is especial
­ly true in the Mountford plot. Charles’s refusal to capitulate to commodity
 exchange, and the play’s excessive emphasis on the Mountford’s refusal to sell
 their remaining land, is accompanied by great specificity in what they lose,
 2,500 pounds a year in patrimony, and what they retain, 500 pounds and a sum-
17
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mer house. This careful bookkeeping combines with explicit attention to the
 
Mountfords’ changing relation to the means of production; Cranwell reports
 that Charles has “turned a plain countryman” (5.7), indicating that he is no
 longer a landlord. The play continues to emphasize the labor this new relation
 to the land entails, zeroing in on its bodily effects. In order to sustain them
­selves, Charles 
is
 “enforced to follow husbandry” and Susan to “milk” (7.3-4).  
Charles points to “this palm” roughened by labor (39) and “her silver brow”
 blasted by the elements (40-1). Susan tells Shafton, “we feed sparing and we
 labour hard, / We lie uneasy, to reserve to us / And our succession this small
 plot of ground” (44-6). Through Charles’s efforts to adhere to an idealized gift
 ethic, the Mountford plot, contrary to the Senecan vision of benefits which
 effaces the material domain, reinstates the material 
as
 a locus of value.
In the very materiality of its unrelenting attention to the consequences of
 Charles and Susan’s efforts to “keep this poor house we have left unsold” (7.2),
 the play virtually idealizes their downward mobility. As he tries to dissuade
 Shafton from his efforts to buy, Charles tells him how the “crisis of the landed
 gentry” feels:
I have so bent my thoughts to husbandry
That I protest I scarcely can remember
What a new fashion is, how silk or satin
Feels in my hand; why, pride is grown to us
 
A mere, mere stranger. I have quite forgot
 The names of all that ever waited on me;
I cannot name ye any of my hounds,
Once from whose echoing mouths I heard all the music
That e’er my heart desired. What should I say?
To keep this place I have changed myself away.
(47-65)
Here, Charles recounts a series of alienations and forgettings, both material and
 
immaterial, from the feel of rich fabrics and the sounds of barking hounds, to
 the names of servants. Charles personifies pride in order to express his alien
­ation from it. This series of losses culminates in Charles’s alienation from his
 former self: “I have changed myself away.” He endures all these losses in order
 to hold on to his last vestige of the old order, the ancestral land. These para
­doxically ennobling losses cause Charles to bend his thoughts to husbandry, so
 that he becomes a most devoted husband to the land, refusing to let it pass out
­side of the family.
But the honorable exchange of “good turns” that
 
ideally expresses the  bonds  
between family members is obstructed when Charles’s kinfolk reject his suit for
 help to get out of debtor’s prison. When Susan seeks assistance from their kin
 and friends, they not only refuse to offer help but also refuse to recognize their
 former ties to Charles. His uncle rejects the bond of
 
kinship, saying Charles  
“lost my
 
kindred  when he fell to need” (9.17); Sandy rejects friendship, “I knew  
you ere your brother sold his land” (22); and Cousin Tydy claims, “I am no
 cousin unto them that borrow” (36). Sandy, a former tenant whom Charles
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gave a farm “rent-free” (27), refuses to requite the favor. With the rebuff from
 
family and friends to help free Charles from prison, the whole range of
 
social  
and personal relations' — family/kin, friend, tenant — dissolves, a dissolution
 that is expressed by their refusals to grant good turns. When he discovers the
 refusal of his kin, Charles laments the fetters of disgrace that their ingratitude
 brings to the family name: “Unthankful kinsmen! Mountfords all too base! /
 To let thy name lie fettered in disgrace!” (10.5-6). Familial ingratitude, like
 deflowering the virgin title to the land, is a violation of the gift ethic; both are
 seen, therefore, to disgrace the family name.
Upon the news that it is the bounty of Acton and not of his kin that frees
 
him from prison, Charles reveals that the accrued debt of honor diminishes his
 sense of self. Ever true to the gift ethic, Charles believes physical imprison
­ment would be less onerous than the weighty debt of honor to Acton. He
 expresses great distress and identity confusion upon the news that Acton freed
 him from prison:
By Acton freed! Not all thy manacles
Could fetter so my heels as this one word
Hath thralled my heart, and it must now he bound
 
In more strict prison than thy stony gaol.
Had this proceeded from my friends, or [father]
 
From them this action had deserved my life,
 And from a stranger more, because from such
 There is less execution of good deeds.
But he, nor father, nor ally, nor friend,
 
More than a stranger, both remote in blood
 And in his heart opposed my enemy,
 O there I lose myself. What should I say?
 What think? what do, his bounty to repay?
  
(10.92-5,109-18)
If before, Charles “changed [him] self away” in bending his thoughts to hus
­
bandry, here, his debt to a gift-giving enemy causes him to “lose [him]self.” He
 plans to use Susan as a semi-commodified return gift to Acton in order to
 redeem himself: “Though poor, my heart is set / In one rich gift to pay back
 all my debt” (123-4). Refusing to deflower the virgin title to the family home
 retains the honor of the family name; now that that name “lies fettered in dis
­grace” due to familial ingratitude, Charles offers the defloration of Susan to
 retain his sense of personal honor.
Susan wavers uncontrollably in Charles’s language between gift, commodi
­
ty, currency, and fellow transactor 
as
 he tells her why he has “tricked [her] like  
a bride” (14.1). By claiming that she should “stand / In joint-bond bound to
 satisfy the debt” (74-5), he situates her as a
 
potential transactor in the deal. But  
by referring to Susan as “such a present, such an acquittance for the knight to
 seal” (94-5), he positions her both as a gift and 
as
 the legal document dis ­
charging his debt which Acton’s “seal” would formalize. Charles also figures
19
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 currency when he values her "rich jewel” (48) at 500 pounds plus “inter ­
est” (46), ignoring Vives’ pleas to chaste maids: “I pray thee, understand thine
 own goodness, maid, thy price cannot be estimated” (104). Finally, he offers
 Susan to Acton as a “pawn” in absence of “ready coin” (14.105-6). Susan’s vac
­illating figuration as gift, money and potential transactor contributes to rather
 than allays anxieties about the distinctions between personal and legal
 exchanges, and those between gift and commodity.
Because he is freed from the burden of redeeming his family’s name,
 
Charles can enlist the riches of Susan to save him from incurring “the world’s
 disgrace” (14.12) by dying indebted to his enemy. When he tells Susan,
 “tricked . . . like a bride” (1), “It lies in thee ... to acquit me free, / And all my
 debt I may outstrip by thee” (16-17), she responds much as does Isabella,
 “tricked” like a novice nun, to Lucio’s suggestion that she might “assay what
 pow’r you have” to help Claudio (Measure 1.4.76). Isabella’s halting questions
 — “Alas, what poor / Ability’s in me to do him good? . . . My power? Alas, I
 doubt —” (74-5, 77) — parallel those of Susan, who stammers: “By me? Why
 I have nothing, nothing ... I am not worth —” (14.18-20). Charles interrupts
 her faltering questions:
O sister, say not so.
It lies in you my downcast state to raise,
To make me stand on even points with the world.
Come, sister, you are rich! Indeed you are!
And in your power you have, without delay,
 
Acton’s five hundred pound back to repay.
(20-5)
Like Charles, Lucio interrupts Isabella’s “Alas, I doubt —”:
Our doubts are traitors,
And makes us lose the good we oft might win,
By fearing to attempt. Go to Lord Angelo,
And let him learn to know, when maidens sue,
Men give like gods.
(1.4.77-81)
Both sisters have to put the power of the virtue that lies “in” them into circula
­
tion in order for its value to be realized. Both might therefore seem to be fig
­ured merely as ransom money or gift-bribes, since both sisters, unbeknownst to
 themselves, are brides-(and bribes)-to-be. However, both are also themselves
 transactors. Just as Charles positions Susan as a transactor “in joint-bond
 bound,” Lucio positions Isabella as a suitor (“when maidens sue / Men give like
 gods”). Susan, moreover, has repeatedly refused the gifts Acton has offered in
 his efforts to woo her (“He dotes on me, and oft hath sent me gifts, / Letters,.
 and tokens: I refused them all” [10.121-2]). Because of this continual slippage, we cannot assert that either Susan or Isabella is merely a medium or object of
 exchange, whether gift, commodity, or money.
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To understand how Susan does not function merely as an object of
 
exchange, a commodity or currency
 
without value unless put in circulation, we  
must attend to her interactions/transactions with Acton before Charles
 becomes aware of them. Recalling that Charles has a sister, Acton plans to use
 her defloration as a means of revenge, and bribing Susan with gifts is to be the
 means for executing this plan: "I'll proffer largely, but the deed being done /
 I’ll smile to see her base confusion” (7.83-4). When Acton first sees Susan,
 however, sudden desire for her disrupts this original plan,33 as she becomes
 invested with value for him independent of the relationship with Charles.
 Actons sudden desire for Susan means that she is no longer an empty means of
 revenge, but a desirable thing with a kind of use-value, 
as
 well as a means of  
representing the personal enmity between Charles and Acton. Like Euphues,
 courted by “sundry devices” of flatterers, Susan has to resist participating in a
 corrupted form of exchange. She is therefore not only a desirable thing with a
 use-value but a transactor, a position that enables her to refuse Actons gifts:
 
“
See, I spurn his gold; / My honour never shall for gain be sold” (9.53-4).  
Acton laments that he cannot “woo her with gifts” since she refuses them (62-





/ As shall o’ercome her hate and conquer it” (66-7). The “kindness”  
Acton plans to “fasten” on Susan links this plot to Johns liberal “judgment.”
 Combined with Actons assertion that “In her I’ll bury my hate of him” (72),
 Actons new plan to secure Susans indebtedness by using Charles illustrates
 that Charles serves as a medium to solidify the relationship between Susan and
 Acton as much 
as
 Susan serves to eradicate the antagonism between the two  
men.34
We can also understand the obsession with female chastity, then, as a
 
defense against how, in some contexts, a womans desirability for heterosexual
 men can incite efforts to bribe her with gifts, not just use her as a semi-com
­modified gift; heterosexual male desire becomes a problem because it encour
­ages the use of corrupt gifts and turns women not only into sullied objects of
 exchange but into potentially corrupted transactors.35




wrested courtesy” (14.121), suddenly relents, recognizing  
that his former desire for revenge cannot be weighed against the debt of grati




Was ever known in any former age
Such honorable wrested courtesy?
Lands, honors, lives, and all the world forgo
Rather than stand engaged to such a foe.
(14.118,120-3)
Despite his former efforts to bribe and exact revenge, Acton is finally forcibly
 
converted to the gift ethic. Although he offers marriage almost as unexpected
­ly as Duke Vincentio, Acton does so as part of a competitive display of liberal-
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ity and gratitude between himself and the Mountfords. Unlike the duke, who
 
had to emend his proposal from a command to a generous offer, Acton has
 quickly internalized the ethic of
 
the gift. Acton’s proposal comes as both an  
acceptance Your metamorphised foe receives your
 
gift /  In satisfaction of all  





 Angelo refuses Isabella’s prayers, which she calls a “bribe” (2.2.150)  
whose value is above the 
"
fond " rate (154) of the market, the “metamorphised  
foe Acton receives Charles's gift.” Both sisters are spared from yielding up
 their chastity. Rather than the bed trick substitutions and pretense of liberali
­ty that spare Isabella from Angelo in Measure for Measure, Susan is spared by
 the tortured ethos of the gift operating in the play, an ethos strained almost to
 the breaking
 
point by the  logic of contractual, calculated debts, and  by the mal ­
leable status of Susan
'
s chastity as it slides between gift, commodity, and cur ­
rency. In its very insistence on refusing commodity exchange, the subplot
 enacts the collapse of the imaginative economies of gift and commodity. The
 language of calculated debts commingles with that of debts of honor which are
 beyond calculation. I therefore disagree
 
with Nancy Gutierrez when she argues  
that Susan’s use 
as
 repayment makes “all too explicit the patriarchy’s attitude  
that a woman’s chastity, in spite of the idealized descriptions of its value as a
 sign of worthiness and character, is a mere commodity, to be bought and sold
 at male discretion” (280). Despite its centrality in “burying” the antagonism
 between Acton and Charles, the status of Susan’s chastity is far too unstable to
 be conceived 
as
 a “mere commodity.” Seeing it as such discounts the way in  
which Susan, refusing Acton’s bribes, acts as a willful non-transactor, not an
 object of exchange. Moreover, as we have seen, the inability of a husband to
 buy, sell, or give his wife’s chastity at his discretion drives the main plot of the
 play. In fact, the way in which Susan’s chastity can be maneuvered in the sub
­plot — the way it combines use and exchange value — brings into relief how
 brittle the means for determining the value of a wife’s chastity is. Although the
 language and logic at work most centrally in the subplot once Acton is “meta
­morphised” figures Susan as a gift, the movement back to alliance has been
 enabled by the figurative malleability and maneuverability of her maiden




volatility of Susan’s status in Woman Killed belies Gutierrez’s assertion that  
“Lévi-Strauss’s thesis that the exchange of woman is the basis of culture is
 applicable to early modern England” (272). In addition to discounting the
 complexity of Susan’s representation, the claim that Lévi-Strauss’s paradigm is
 “applicable to early modern England” assumes that
 
kinship is the  primary orga ­
nizational structure of this culture, since, 
as
 Rubin points out, the exchange of  
women functions 
as
 the basis of the social order in those cultures based pri ­
marily on kinship as an organizational structure, in the absence of other gov
­erning institutions, such as the law or the state. England in the sixteenth and
 early seventeenth centuries was not devoid of other governing institutions;
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moreover, several historians object to grounding social analysis, including
 
analysis of the construction of gender, in kinship. Joan Scott, for example,
 argues that
 
historical analysis must aim to discover  the struggle that leads to the  
“appearance of timeless permanence in binary gender representation” (43).
 Scott critiques scholarship that focuses exclusively, or even primarily, on kinship
 as the domain where gender is constructed for helping to efface such struggle:
Some scholars, notably anthropologists, have restricted the use of gender to
 
the kinship system (focusing on household and family as the basis for social
 organization). We need a broader view that includes not only kinship but
 also . . . the labor market (a sex-segregated labor market is a part of the
 process of gender construction), education (all-male, single-sex, or coedu
­cational institutions are part of the same process), and the polity (universal
 male suffrage is part of the process of gender construction). . . . Gender 
is constructed through kinship, but not exclusively; it is constructed as well in
 the economy and the polity, which, in our society at least, now operate
 largely independently of kinship.
(43-4)36
Although he does not claim that kinship bears no relation to other institutions
 
or organizations, Keith Wrightson argues convincingly against the view that
 kinship is the basic organizational unit of the local community
 
in early modern  
England. He points to great variation in who was recognized as kin, illustrat
­ing how “kinship shaded into friendship in its practical importance. It was one
 of many social bonds, rather than a dominant principle in the social structure,
 one of many foundations on which the individual might build up a network of
 social contacts” (50).
A wholesale importation of the exchange-of-women concept into England
 
in our period introduces the potential for making inaccurate generalizations.
 Regarding marriage and inheritance practices, it only applies to those with
 property (and even among those with property, not just fathers and potential
 suitors “bargain”),37 it fails to consider the legal and social status of widows, and
 many historians question the prevalence of arranged, enforced marriage even
 among the propertied.38 The uncritical
 
use of the exchange-of-women concept  
also has the potential of
 
effacing the extent to which women were transactors  
themselves — at market, in the household, at birthings and christenings, 
as patrons, as providers of charity, 
as
 audiences at the theater39 — in addition to  
conveyors of their own vows and bodies. Susan and Isabella are situated as
 transactors as much as they
 
function as gifts or money. Although she functions  
partially as a gift between Charles and Acton, Susan, in her very refusal to
 transact with Acton, is a potential transactor. Using the concept uncritically
 not only ignores women s potential 
as
 transactors but also can efface the extent  
to which women could and did resist their positioning 
as
 objects of exchange.
The uncritical application of the traffic-in-women paradigm needs modifi
­cation not only when one thinks of it as a literal structure organizing the social
 formation; for early modern England, it needs careful refinement if used 
as
 a 
figurative construct or even as a governing fiction. To assert that women are
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objects of exchange ignores the fact that there is more than one kind of object
 
of exchange, and that there 
is
 more than one system of exchange by which  
objects circulate. One cannot assert that
 
women function like commodities, or  
that women’s sexuality 
is
 a commodity, without considering the distinctions  
between commodities and gifts. Strictly speaking, a commodity is alienable;
 that is, although it 
is
 a possession, it is distinct from its owner. As Marx says  
at the opening of Capital: “A commodity is, in the first place, an object outside
 us” (43), and hence it is transferable to others. Though owned by, or proper to,
 an individual or group, a commodity is transferable to others through sale or
 barter. Once a marriage “transaction” takes place, thinking literally, a woman
 no longer has exchange-value; she is no longer transferable, at least according
 to dominant, normative ideologies of marriage. As husband and wife become
 “one flesh,” the maid/commodity is no longer an “object outside” her husband.
 As the Frankford-Wendoll plot painstakingly unravels, a married woman is
 “out of circulation,” and a married man cannot become one with both his wife
 and his beloved friend. Also strictly speaking, the exchange-value of a com
­modity is calculable according
 
to the going  rate. The value of a woman’s chasti ­
ty, at least in the ideal construction of
 
it, exceeds calculation, is priceless, and  
hence is positioned conceptually in the gift economy. Unlike the exchange of
 commodities, as Nancy Hartsock notes, the exchange of women
transforms all
 
participants in the transaction. The buyer or seller of a com ­
modity remains buyer or seller after the purchase/sale, but after a woman is
 exchanged, those who were strangers are now affines, and the woman her
­self
 
becomes part of another lineage, a married woman, an adult. Every  
participant occupies a different place afterward.
(275)40
This social transformation of both transactors and transacted approximates the
 
effects of gift exchange that forges ongoing affiliations between transactors.
But however much the exchange of women approximates the exchange of
 
gifts, and despite the effort to position women’s chastity in the gift sphere, the
 gift of chastity is one that cannot really
 
be given. Rather, it is moré often seen  
as potentially lost or violated. Chastity is a woman’s virtue, but once she is mar ­
ried it is not hers to give. Rights of sexual access belong to a husband, but his
 wife’s chastity is not a
 
gift which he can bestow on others either. A woman can  
lose her chastity
 
or give it up — for money, to save her  brother’s life or honor —  
but she exchanges the loss of it for this other thing. She is forced to weigh the
 negative value of its loss against the value of what she is losing it for. More
­over, if desired sexually, women’s chaste bodies do not, like gifts, function as the
 “mere badge” of transactors’ goodwill. In the idealist gift scheme, the locus of
 value 
is
 not in the “matter of the benefit,” but things need to be exchanged in  
order to manifest or betoken the “benefit itself.” This need for a transaction
 event in order to express idealized ties between men becomes a problem when
 one or both of the exchange partners has desire for the material object itself.
 The best intentions of a giver cannot control the power of the matter of the
 benefit to engage the affective or erotic energies of
 
the recipient. This is yet  
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another way in which the gift relation cannot be utterly separated from the
 
commodity relation. The gift, as a thing, is in principle the “badge” or token of
 some other good, not valued or even desired in its own right. Once they are
 valued/desired in their own right (as objects or things or even as persons)
 women cannot be used 
as
 gifts between men. Once the transactors’ erotic or  
affective energies are engaged, woman-as-object-of-exchange slips into a dif
­ferent register.
Deliberately or not, the drama that centers on questions of female chastity
 
and marriage exposes how
 
a sharp distinction cannot be drawn between gift and  
commodity exchange. In the plays, marriage is seen to incorporate elements of
 both forms of exchange, disrupting other social bonds and itself being disrupt
­ed by them. The ethic of the gift, markedly absent in Measure for Measure, has
 to be manufactured by the duke in order to keep female chastity in controlled
 circulation. In A Woman Killed with Kindness this ethic, and the power of con
­science that underlies it, 
is
 pushed almost to the breaking point. The plays are  
problems because they expose the contradictions that arise when one tries to
 distinguish sharply between exchange motivated by the desire for personal or
 social bonds, enforceable only by trust, and that motivated by the individual’s
 desire for profit, enforceable only by legal coercion. By
 
offering plots and char ­
acters who try to position women as objects of exchange, the plays expose that
 such a sharp distinction between gift relations and commodity relations cannot
 be drawn; in the process, they show how
 
female sexuality exceeds the means for  
establishing value in either system of exchange. However central to the main
­tenance of the dominant social order, female chastity confounds the economic




In “Constructing Female Sexuality in the Renaissance,” Neely aptly  
articulates the reasons for the period’s concern with female chastity:
Female sexuality 
is
 at the center of Renaissance definitions of female gen ­
der roles. The source of women’s power, it demands their subordination.
 Female sexuality 
is
 necessary for men to satisfy their desires and to fulfill  
their
 
gender  role requirements appropriately.... But  it is potentially uncon ­
trollable or unobtainable; it reminds men that they are all vulnerable moth
­er’s sons, that all children are potentially illegitimate. . . . The reiterated
 admonitions in the prescriptive literature that women should be chaste,
 modest, silent, and obedient are directed to a single end. Modesty, silence,
 and obedience all ensure chastity.
(212-3)
See also the discussions of the cultural and dramatic discourses of female sexu
­
ality in Breitenberg, Carroll, and DiGangi.
2.
 
I have benefited from Carroll’s attention to the importance of negation  
in Shakespeare’s representation of virginity. Rose explores how in Hamlet and
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Measure for Measure “femininity” functions as excess that is beyond interpretive
 
schema and beyond representation (114). We will see in A Woman Killed With
 Kindness and Measure
 
for Measure how female sexuality, especially a wife’s  
chastity, exceeds the means for determining value of both gift and commodity
 exchange. In “The Cultural Biography of Things,” Kopytoff explains the
 notion of the “singular” or “sacralized” versus the “common,” notions that pro
­vide 
a
 way to understand some of  the confusions surrounding female chastity  
and the need to complicate the “exchange of women” concept that I have been
 stressing here. He asserts: “To be saleable for money or to be exchangeable for
 a wide array of other things 
is
 to have something in common  with a large num ­
ber of exchangeable things that, taken together, partake of a single universe of
 comparable values. . . . [T]o be saleable or widely exchangeable is common —
 the opposite of being incomparable, singular, unique, and therefore not
 exchangeable for anything else” (69). Although Kopytoff argues that these are
 “ideal polar types” that no “real economic system could conform to either” (69-
 70), he suggests, following Durkheim, that “societies need to set apart a certain
 portion of their environment, marking it 
as
 ‘sacred,’” and that “singularizaron  
is one means to this end” (73). Singularized, sacralized, female chastity is con
­structed again and again in the sphere of the gift; but it serves as a gift that has
 “terminal” exchange status — once given, it can’t be exchanged again. Women
 have relatively greater “commodity candidacy,” mainly in the marriage transac
­tion, but female chastity, which defines women’s marriageability, is constructed
 partially as a gift. The repeated efforts to mark their chastity as a prime value,
 one that cannot be priced, shows a defensive effort to sacralize their sexuality,
 to singularize it so that it is not exchangeable for counterpart values. We will
 see how the duke’s machinations and the bed trick in Measure for Measure, and
 the “honorable wrested courtesy” of the Mountfords, belie this effort.
3.
 
See Neely’s Broken Nuptials (58-64) for a history of the term “problem  
plays.” On Measure in particular, see 92-102. On the critical history of A
 Woman Killed with Kindness, see Baines’s Thomas Heywood (79-103), Spacks,
 Bromley, and the introduction in Scobie’s edition. It is interesting to me that
 much of the negative evaluation of Heywood’s drama lambasts him for pander
­ing to commercial tastes; he is attacked for being “a purveyor of this kind of




The first three books of De Beneficiis were translated by Nicholas Hay ­
ward, The Line
 
ofLiberalitie Dulie Directinge the Wei Bestowing of  Benefits (1569;  
STC 12939). Seneca’s work was also translated by Thomas Lodge, the author
 of An
 
Alarum  Against Usurers, a cautionary tale of one young man’s victimiza ­
tion by a usurer and his agent. Lodge’s first translation of De Beneficiis appears
 with a translation of
 
all of Seneca’s prose works in 1613, enlarged in a second  
edition in 1620 (STC 22213, 22214).
5.
 
See Cowie for a discussion of how Lévi-Strauss’s exchange of women  
concept presupposes what it aims to explain, positing the “value” of woman
 prior to culture. Hartsock’s critique of Rubin (293-303) is a wonderfully lucid
 theoretical account of how Rubin replicates the problems in Lévi-Strauss. Also
 see Henrietta Moore, especially 60-2, on the debate over the exchange of
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between discussing women's access to property and seeing them  
as a kind of property. This conceptual issue is explored in Strathern. The dif
­ference between women as autonomous subjects and as objects in Renaissance
 ideologies of marriage is addressed by Belsey.
6.
 
See my “Peopling, Profiting and Pleasure in The Tempest” for a reading  




See The Lawes Resolution of Womens Rights, 41-7, on dower and jointure,  
the exchanges of property that accompany marriage.
8.
 
Swinburne was a leading ecclesiastical lawyer whose work on testaments  
and spousals remained standard references for over a century. Of Spousals was
 published posthumously. For a discussion of Swinburne and the relation
 between common and civil law, see Palliser 359. See Ingram 125-67 for a full
 discussion of the legal jurisdiction over marriage. On the difficulties encoun
­tered because of competing conceptions of what constituted matrimony, see
 Cook, chapter 8. Hayne offers an excellent discussion of how Measure
 
for Mea ­
sure intervenes in the debates about the social practices and legalities of
 betrothal and marriage 
as
 well as helpful summary of critical commentary on  
these issues in the play.
9.
 
By de-emphasizing the importance of consummation, Swinburne  
departs from The Lawes Resolution of Womens Rights, in which consummation 
is more central. See Book II, section xxi and Book III, section i.
10.
 
As Wheeler points out, despite his expression of contempt for Pom ­
pey’s profession (3.2.20-8), the duke approaches it himself (121-2). He argues
 that the duke nonetheless 
is
 exalted over Angelo by play’s end. The exaltation  
of the duke takes the form of his liberality; because the play exposes the machi
­nations and reliance on degraded forms of exchange entailed in staging the
 duke’s liberality, I disagree with Wheeler’s reading of him as the “unacknowl
­edged victim” of the comic design. In her focus on the duke as a theatricalist
 who arouses the conscience of his spectators, Diehl offers a more salutary view
 of him than my reading allows for. Diehl acknowledges, however, that the duke
 figures 
as
 an “imperfect playwright” who can be understood in terms of Calvin ­
ist notions of depravity.
11.
 
McFeely argues that the play registers Shakespeare’s respect for monas ­
ticism, and for Isabella’s efforts to keep her chastity out of circulation by enter
­ing the convent. She points to the convent as a locus of hospitality (203), one
 of the period’s most salient forms of gift exchange, 
as




Sundelson argues that the duke earns Isabella’s perpetual gratitude by  
defining a hierarchy — patron and debtor — in his marriage offer (88). Also
 see Baines, “Assaying the Power of Chastity” on how the duke’s marriage offer
 exploits the pretense of liberality.
13.
 
Dollimore discusses sexual offense as a seeming threat to authority that  
in fact legitimates it.
14.
 
Pompey’s sensitivity to the relation between the law against fornication  
and the “laws“ of supply, demand, and market value is like that of Launcelot in
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The Merchant of Venice when he jests that the conversion of Jews will raise the
 
price of pork:
We were Christians enough before, e’en as many as could well live one by
 
another. This making of Christians will raise the price of hogs. If we grow





Shell makes a similar point (98-9). Watson explores the implications  
of the play’s pervasive coining imagery as well (137-8).
16.
 
See Leonard and Kott. Also see Shell, especially chapters four and five,  
on the function of exchange in the play. On the role of human bodies as fun
­gible coins in the play’s vision of state-sponsored procreative love, see Watson,
 135-6. Diehl examines the pattern of substitutions in the play in terms of








Elbow, the "poor Duke’s constable” who "lean[s] upon justice” (2.1.47-  
9), embodies the ineffectiveness of formal legal regulation of sexuality and mar
­riage contracts. His malaprop-filled accusations against Froth and Pompey
 point to the blurring of licit and illicit sexuality, and to the inability of the law
 to interrogate sexual intentions. Although he is the only legally married man
 in the play, his wife is "done” (2.1.118,140,142) in Mistress Overdone’s broth
­el, or so the cryptic scene suggests. Pompey punningly hints that it is Elbow’s
 wife’s own pregnancy-induced "longing” that brings her into the brothel (89-
 90). Arguing that chastity 
is
 a political principle because it is the principle of  
the integrity of the family, itself a political unit, Jaffa comments that Elbow 
is ironically the play’s only "family man” (182-4).
19.
 
Parolles’s arguments for forsaking virginity are echoed by Lucilla’s  
father Ferardo, early in Euphues when he tries to control her sexuality by con
­vincing her to marry:
This grieveth me most, that thou art almost
 
vowed to the vain order of the  
vestal virgins. ... If thy mother had been of that mind when she was a
 maiden, thou hadst not now been born to be of
 
this mind to be a virgin.  
Weigh with thyself what slender profit they bring to the commonwealth,
 what slight pleasure to themselves, what great grief to their parents. . . .
 Therefore, Lucilla, if thou have any care to be a comfort to my hoary hairs
 or a commodity to thy commonweal, frame thyself to that honourable
 estate of matrimony,
(Lyly 71)
By abandoning her vow to remain a virgin, the argument runs, Lucilla will be a
 
"comfort” and a "commodity,” combining
 
the performance of filial duty  and ser ­
vice to the state. Interestingly, Ferardo’s argument also appeals to the satisfac
­tion of young women’s own "pleasure.”
28





For a discussion of how feudal property relations establish a link  
between landholding, marriage and procreation, and how this link in turn
 defines womens subordinate position and leads to efforts to control female sex
­uality, see Middleton. The violation of marital chastity could bring legal action
 in the period, although questions remain about how enforceable these laws
 were. See Fletcher and Stevenson 32-3, on the increased attention on the part
 of nonecclesiastical court justices to efforts to enforce such laws in 1600-1660.
 Also see Ingram.
21.
 
Baines thus explains why the violation of chastity in particular is the  
vice selected to reestablish law and order in Vienna. She argues that the play
 exposes that chastity 
is
 a socially and politically determined virtue, rather than  
a religious one. As Shell points out, the play focuses on fornication because its
 prohibition is the “bulwark of politics and the law itself ” (33).
22.
 
The crucial exception to this pattern comes in the second scene when  
a quarrel between the servants and “country fellows” ends with the friendly
 clasping of hands in dance. Thus, the corruption or dissolution of promise 
is class-marked; Heywood’s country folk easily overcome the antagonisms that
 impede the friendly handclasp that betokens a faithful promise.
23.
 
My efforts to use the drama to historicize the particular forms of  
exchange at work
 
in early  modern England are indebted to the theoretical work  
of Gregory and the essays by Appadurai and Kopytoff.
24.
 
The usurer is the scapegoat for the whole culture, which uses usury to  
explain the economic and social upheaval precipitated by the move toward cap
­italistic forms of production and the rise of money form. The plays with usurers
 often manipulate the contrasts and overlaps between the bond of fellowship
 and legal bonds. Cf. Shylock in The Merchant of Venice and Sir Giles Overreach
 in A New Way to Pay Old Debts.
25.
 
Bach asserts that the play “is not about the heterosexual couple in any  
way that that couple is now recognizable to us” (504). She argues that the focus
 in the critical tradition on the married couple “has obscured some the play’s
 central issues” (505), especially its exploration of homosocial relations between
 men. I am indebted to Bach’s attention to Anne and John 
as
 “enmeshed in the  
network of friendship, service and kinship relations that the play continually
 represents” (509). Gutierrez suggests that the play exposes the inadequacy of
 marriage, family, and patriarchal authority as the source of social order, and,
 with Wendoll’s disruption of the husband-wife dyad, the tension between
 
“fam ­
ily interrelationships and extra-familial bondings” (268). Christensen offers a
 convincing analysis of the tensions in the play and in the culture that follow
 from the transitional nature of household economy in the period.
26.
 
Cf. Orlin’s argument that the old code of Renaissance male friendship  
and beneficence can no longer obtain under the new domestic ethic (138,180).
 Bach’s reading of Wendoll is likewise instructive: Wendoll “endangers the
 bonds between men by identifying too closely with the source of economic
 power — Frankford — without possessing a means of allying to that power —
 without a female affine who can be traded to form an alliance” (517).
27.
 
Again we see how corrupted exchange is class-marked for Heywood.  
Wendoll says “I will return. / And I divine, however now dejected, / My worth
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and parts being by some great man praised, / At my return I may in court be
 
raised” (16.134-7). As in Lyly’s Euphues, aristocrats and courtiers are con
­structed as corrupt transactors.
28.
 
Christensen notes how Frankford dwells at length on the wasted gifts  
that he has bestowed on Anne, despite the fact that
 




See Wentworth on how the main plot of the play “domesticates” the  
fall and repentance pattern of the medieval morality. McLuskie discusses the




For a wonderful  reading of the way the play blunts and parodies its own  
didacticism, see Moisan, who argues that the play destabilizes “the fixity of the
 social order in which the husband would claim his victory” (173). His analysis
 of how the play
 
“exposes the weaknesses in the very  patriarchalist prescriptions  
it ostensibly affirms” (178) is consistent with my argument here.
31.
 
Moisan reads the relation between the main plot and subplot in terms  
compatible with my own; see 178ff.
32.
 
McLuskie points out the combination of metaphor and dramatic struc ­
ture concerning honor and the jewel of virginity at work in Heywood’s subplot
 (127). Charles Mountford’s metaphor of defloration equates commodifying the
 land with female sexual despoliation. His metaphor not only shows the inter
­dependence of gendered constructions of honor, it feminizes aristocratic
 male/family honor. This same metaphorical move 
is
 made in discussions of the  
sale of titles and honors under James I. In their efforts to impeach James’s
 favorite Buckingham, members of both houses of Parliament attacked “[t]he
 introduction of this new trade and commerce of honor” (Peck 194); they
 claimed that before Buckingham “honor was a virgin and undeflowered” (194-
 5). These metaphors of defloration — the conceptual equation of commodifi
­cation and female sexual despoliation that they enact — reveal the interrelated
 concerns over what should or should not be passed in unrestricted exchange —
 the exchange status of objects, whether land or women, and the gendered
 notions of honor that inhere in them.
33.
 
The way in which Acton’s desire for Susan disrupts his desire for  
revenge might be compared to how Volpone’s desire for Celia disrupts his
 scheme to cheat the legacy hunters who “contend in gifts, as they would seem
 in love” (Jonson 1.1.84). Like Susan, Celia is positioned as a slippery combi
­nation of gift and commodity, but it is “funnier” in Celia’s case because it is her
 husband who is doing so.
34.
 
My argument here departs from Bach’s emphasis on the centrality of  
homosocial bonds in the play.
35.
 
Swinburne betrays discomfort over how gifts can be used both to solid ­
ify a spousal and as “bait” (210) or a means of seduction (209). He both ideal
­izes the exchange of the ring 
as
 a symbol of the matrimonial bond (207-8) and  




Scott is to some extent mistaken in her critique since, for anthropolo ­
gists, kinship does not simply refer to “household and family,” as she implies
 here.
30





See Cook, chapter five, especially 105-9. Greene and Kahn address the  
need to consider women 
as
 matchmakers and bearers of wealth (10-12).
38.
 
See, for example, Wrightson and Ingram
39.
 
See Cahn’s Industry of Devotion and Chaytor and Lewis’s introduction  
to Clark for a discussion of the changing relation of women and the “domestic
 economy” to the market in this period. See Heal on birth celebrations as an
 “essentially female ritual” (81) and on women’s use of the household as a “sphere
 of social action through generosity” (178-83). Harris discusses elite women as
 politically influential patrons and gift-givers. Willen discusses ordinary
 women’s varying roles as dispensers of charity in
 
poverty relief programs. Argu ­
ing that women’s work in this area shows the inapplicability of our definitions
 of public and private (197), she reveals how women “routinely worked in the
 public marketplace to sustain their
 
households; when employed by civic author ­
ities to perform social welfare services, they served a public function, extending
 welfare services to the general population” (198). See also Howard. Gurr pre
­sents good evidence of women as playgoers.
40.
 
My formulation, here and throughout, of how women function vari ­
ously 
as
 gifts, commodities, and non-gifts and non-commodities — and of the  
important differences between materialist and idealist conceptions of value —
 is greatly indebted to Hartsock’s critique of Lévi-Strauss and of Rubin’s use of
 Lévi-Strauss’s kinship theory in “The Traffic in Women.” For research assis
­tance on this 
essay,
 I would like to thank John Crossley.
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